Facing a Rising China, Conflict or Cooperation

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your kind invitation. I am delighted and honoured to have this opportunity to deliver the keynote speech before such a distinguished audience. The theme of a rising china is highly topical. The 19th century was the age of European and particularly British imperialism. The 20th century belonged to the United States, thanks to its victories in the Second World War and in the Cold War. The 21st century now sees Asia shifting towards centre stage in the global economy and in international politics. Half a millennium of Western dominance is at an end, and a new power constellation is taking shape.

For the G7, comprising the leading Western industrialised nations, the dawning of the Asian age marks a watershed of far greater significance than the end of the Cold War. The latter resulted in a restructuring process within the sphere of European civilisation. Today, however, the world is confronted with the renaissance of a sphere of culture and civilisation that is fundamentally different to that of the West. The United States and China ? and presumably India too in the future ? are the key players in this new configuration. Some observers believe that the global leadership role is about to change hands, arguing that China has already caught up with the United States and will soon overtake it economically and then, in due course, militarily.

This analysis strikes me as premature in some respects. In my opinion, it reflects an exaggerated fear of the power and potential sole predominance of China. That country faces formidable challenges in the field of domestic policy, given the lack of social-security systems, increasing environmental pollution and growing income differentials. Moreover, particularly because of its dependence on exports, China relies on stable market conditions and on the maintenance of its own high growth rates, which cannot be taken for granted. At the same time, its high currency reserves have created mutual dependence between China and the United States. To a certain extent, this close interdependence condemns the United States and China, as it were, to cooperation.

What is certain is that the G20 countries, through their economic upsurge, have also become new centres of political power. They themselves lay claim to a more active role in shaping international politics. Accordingly, they can and must assume greater responsibility too. The political role of Asia on the world stage has not yet started to reflect the growth in its economic importance.

In my short speech, I would like to focus on three points.

1.    Resolution of the Asian security dilemma through cooperation and dialogue

Both Germany and Japan have a fundamental interest in the avoidance of a spiralling security dilemma between China and the United States. Many of China?s neighbours perceive China's approach to be increasingly aggressive. This perception is also inducing them to align themselves more closely with the United States. The area may be known as the Pacific region, but that does not automatically make it peaceful. The fact is that Asia has not only become the engine room of the global economy but is also the seat of several acute or latent conflicts. I am thinking here of the Korean peninsula, of the difficult relationship between China and Japan, of Taiwan, of the South China Sea, of the Indian subcontinent, with the rivalry between Islamabad and Delhi, and of the Indian Ocean, with its vulnerable straits. The future fate of the world economy is closely linked to the growth of Asian prosperity. Yet many future global crises will also have their roots in Asia.

The rise of China to the status of a world power not only gives it rights but also imposes obligations, and so we should not shrink from naming the adverse aspects of the Chinese upsurge, such as the expansion of military capabilities, disregard for human rights and exploitation of natural resources. Time will tell whether China is also prepared to act as a global player and make public goods available or whether, in view of its own large domestic market, it might even opt for an isolationist course. The latter choice would have devastating effects on the global order, similar to those generated by the disengagement of the United States after the First World War. The fact is that the regional and global challenges facing us would be practically insuperable without Chinese cooperation.

To administer the world?s public goods, we need a global regulatory policy. Rivalries between the major powers no longer derive from territorial expansionism. The main bone of contention now is the distribution of global public goods. In all areas of international politics, such as climate policy, the distribution of wealth is the underlying issue. Who is to pay the price for environmental protection and sustainability? This will be the key topic of the 21st century. This is why the paramount goal of a European foreign policy must be to play a part in shaping global regulatory power in the framework of the United Nations.

Unlike Europe, Asia has no cooperative institutions covering the entire continent. Bilateral structures predominate, and multilateralism is not yet firmly rooted. This applies especially to the realm of security policy. The Shanghai Cooperation Council and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are certainly very promising models. The next task in the Asia-Pacific region will be to reach agreement on the establishment of closer and more binding security structures. Developments in Myanmar could also inject fresh impetus.

Consideration of European experiences may also prove useful. By founding the European Union, the states of Europe embarked on an innovative and successful journey. In spite of the profound economic and financial crisis of the present time, the EU has been and will remain a success story. The foundations for the ending of the East-West conflict and of the division of Europe are reflected in principles - refraining from the threat or use of force and admissibility of changes to frontiers by peaceful means - that are enshrined in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). These principles ultimately paved the way for the unification of Germany and Europe. To be sure, our experiences with a multilateral and cooperative security order are not directly transferable, but they merit close examination. The EU may not be a model, but it can certainly be an inspiration.

2.    Legal regulation of international relations

I am firmly convinced of the need for Asia and Europe to address global challenges, such as climate change, the debt crisis and nuclear proliferation, together. To this end, we need a fair and just world order. The precept of equal rights for all applies not only to issues of world trade and competition but also to issues of resource consumption and CO2 emissions. A just global order will also entail strengthening and restructuring the relevant institutions. Even though the UN Security Council still mirrors the balance of power that existed in the years following the Second World War, the United Nations remains important. Germany supports a reform of the Security Council that would give considerably more weight to Asia. The G8 and the G20 are important informal coordinating bodies but are no alternative to the United Nations. They can support the United Nations but can never replace it, for they do not possess the necessary legitimacy.

We also need more legal regulation of international relations. The International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court in The Hague and the Hamburg-based International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea must be strengthened; future disputes over territorial waters could be settled by means of expert opinions from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or through the appointment of international boards of arbitration. In this sphere too, there are European examples, such as the successful settlement of the territorial disputes between Slovenia and Croatia regarding the Gulf of Piran in the Adriatic. There are ample cases of territorial disputes having been settled by international arbitral tribunals, even in the wake of civil wars.

3.    The importance of respect and empathy in international relations

Allow me to refer to a third and final point which is often underestimated, namely the importance of respect, empathy and reconciliation in international relations. This is a factor to which particular importance is attached in Asian cultures. Such reconciliation need not entail financial costs. There is also a non-pecuniary form of reconciliation through gestures. The most famous example is surely Willy Brandt kneeling down in front of the monument to the heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1970 - a gesture that paved the way for his Ostpolitik and earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971.

Reconciliation between France and Germany after the Second World War was also underlined by symbolic gestures. The embrace between Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle during the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963 and the handshake between Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand over the military graves at Verdun in 1984 fall into this category. These images have become part of the cultural heritage of both France and Germany.

Respect and empathy are constituent elements of the concept of "soft power", along with economic power, innovativeness and cultural magnetism. The importance of military power, by contrast, is steadily declining. Recognition as a major power is no longer solely dependent on resources. The powers of the future will need other capabilities - soft power, peace-building and stabilisation capacities, the ability to operate within cooperative security systems and willingness to exercise international responsibilities, whether through the United Nations or through regional alliances.
In my opinion, however, the key to the establishment of peaceful international relations will be the ability of the last superpower, the United States, and the new global power, China, together with the European Union and Japan, to agree in the G20 framework on the cooperative shaping of a global order.

Autor: 
Von Rolf Mützenich
Veröffentlicht: 
Tokyo, 08.07.2012
Thema: 
Rede anläßlich einer Konferenz der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Tokio