North Korea in Six Nation Talks

North Korea remains true to its reputation as an unpredictable negotiator. Just one day after the first session of multilateral talks in Peking, at which the six participating delegations (North Korea, USA, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea) had agreed on a continuation of the dialogue within the coming two months, Pyongyang announced on August 31, 2003 that it was no longer interested in further talks about its controversial nuclear program, only to revise this statement again just two days later. The mere fact that representatives of six nations came together in Peking marks an interim success for U.S. diplomacy, which from the outset had been calling for the involvement of all the relevant nations in the region in order to resolve the conflict. However, irrespective of the multilateral framework of the talks, a solution to the nuclear dispute will primarily depend on whether the two main conflicting parties, the U.S. and North Korea, can bring their positions closer together. In the best case, the six-nation meeting represents the commencement of a tough and lengthy process of negotiation, similar to the forceps delivery of the framework agreement concluded between the U.S. and North Korea in 1994, in which North Korea declared itself ready to cease its nuclear program and in return for this promise was given the prospect of generous energy supplies, the construction of two light-water reactors and food shipments. Negotiating this agreement under the leadership of the Clinton Administration took no less than 18 months. A similar marathon looks quite likely once again, this time in a multilateral context.

Nuclear Poker

Since President Bush consigned North Korea to the "axis of evil", the country has been using deliberate provocations to try and force the U.S. into bilateral talks and to improve its negotiating position in the nuclear poker game. The logic behind this is: we shall renounce our nuclear potential; in return, we shall receive security guarantees and economic and financial aid. The wish list presented by North Korea to the American side is long: Pyongyang is demanding a series of advance concessions, such as the signing of a non-aggression pact and diplomatic recognition by the U.S. It is also calling for the provision of economic assistance from South Korea and Japan, as well as compensation payments for energy shortages resulting from delays in the construction of two light-water reactors which the U.S. had promised North Korea in the 1994 framework agreement. The fact that the completion of these reactors had been made dependent on the cessation of the North Korean nuclear program is ignored. In return for this comprehensive catalog of demands, North Korea's regime, which ejected the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors at the end of 2002 and shortly afterwards declared its withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, intends to refrain from the development of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the controversial nuclear facilities would again be opened to international controls and the dismantling of the nuclear facilities would begin. Pyongyang has already sent out several contradictory signals about its nuclear potential. Whilst Washington believes that North Korea has one or two nuclear bombs and could build more in a short time, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumes that, despite advanced research work, Pyongyang does not yet have nuclear arms at its disposal. The uncertainty about the status of the North Korean nuclear program is being deliberately heightened by the North Korean side with contradictory statements and data. Kim Jong Il is clearly trying to play the nuclear card in order to save his doomed totalitarian regime and to obtain concessions from the U.S. Irrespective of whether North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons or not, it certainly has weapons-grade plutonium, which it could use to build nuclear bombs within a few months, as well as the corresponding launcher technology and means to deploy them if necessary.  North Korea seems to regard the nuclear threat as a trump card and ultimately as the only credible joker in order to enforce its interests against a superpower it regards as hostile. This is another reason why Pyongyang is trying to confuse the rest of the world about the status and condition of its nuclear program. If the nuclear crisis centered around North Korea were to escalate further, it can be assumed that Pyongyang would be able to produce one to two nuclear warheads a year from 2004/2005.

Military Option

In the run-up to the meeting in Peking, the U.S. always stressed that it would only be willing to make concessions - such as multilateral security guarantees or economic aid - if North Korea ended its nuclear program completely, verifiably and irreversibly. It also rejects Pyongyang's call for a legally binding bilateral non-aggression pact, which would require the approval of the U.S. Congress. The talks in Peking do not seem to have had any effect on the American position that it will not be forced into a non-aggression pact by North Korea's nuclear threat. Washington insists on the complete absence of nuclear weapons in North Korea, on the latter's return to the non-proliferation treaty and on an opening-up of the country to international inspections. However, the Bush Administration does bear a substantial part of the blame for the escalation of the crisis around North Korea: in spring 2002, North Korea was included in the U.S.'s nuclear target planning, and the national security strategy of September 2002 considered preventive strikes against the "axis of evil" (Iran, Iraq and North Korea). Not wholly without justification, Pyongyang therefore feels directly threatened and challenged by the policies of the United States, even though in Peking the Bush Administration in principle advocated a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis and gave an express assurance that it was not aspiring to Iraq-style regime change. At the same time, however, it made it clear that the military option remains on the table. The American side still seems unable to opt for a coherent North Korea policy. Whilst the "doves" bank on a peaceful resolution to the conflict and are open, if not to a security guarantee, then at least to economic and financial promises, the "hawks" still aim for "regime change". Washington now seems to believe that North Korea can only be contained and deterred by the upholding of a permanent military threat scenario ? supplemented by multilateral negotiations. On top of this there is the fact that the outcome of this crisis will also help to determine the validity and effectiveness of the new U.S. security strategy.

Russia and - particularly - China both have a major geopolitical interest in the existence of a North Korean buffer state. They therefore reject excessively hard-hitting sanctions, which could cause the total collapse of the mismanaged, starving country and trigger refugee flows - probably primarily towards the north-east of China. Both states also proclaim a particularly high level of understanding for North Korea's calls for comprehensive security guarantees. On this point, they urge appropriate movement by the U.S. and call for less harsh rhetoric in future. Peking and Moscow want neither the collapse of the regime nor a North Korea which plays with nuclear weapons and is thus totally unpredictable, something which would give Taiwan and Japan a pretext to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. It is certainly gratifying that China is at last becoming active on the North Korea issue, having pursued a policy of non-intervention for many years. However, it is hard to assess what influence China actually has on Pyongyang. On the one hand, China's co-operation on energy and grain supplies to North Korea is of vital significance, but on the other it is no secret that, under the successor to the extremely pro-China Kim Il Sung, the pro-Chinese forces in the North Korean regime have lost much of their influence.

American Protective Shield

The South Korean government, which is continuing to pursue a comparatively conciliatory policy of rapprochement towards its North Korean neighbor, is also likely to sympathize with the positions of Russia and China. Seoul would prefer a policy of gradual concessions on both sides, i.e. a gradual supply of economic aid to the North going hand in hand with the step-by-step dismantling of the nuclear facilities. However, the security alliance with the U.S. and the reliance on the American protective shield make it seem less than opportune to criticize America's approach at the negotiating table. The same goes for Japan, which - as on most foreign policy issues - is standing firmly behind the U.S.

The six-nation talks are a unique opportunity to contain the Korean nuclear crisis, perhaps even to bring about a solution. If agreement is reached, the larger framework will probably offer better possibilities for enforcement of the agreement, for inspections and controls. North Korea must be brought to a point where it reverses its withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and once more permits IAEA inspections.  If North Korea builds a nuclear bomb, there is a risk of a nuclear arms race in east Asia. In the U.S., the hard-liners in Congress will see their position confirmed, since they regard a military strike against Pyongyang as the best option anyway. South Korea will find it even harder to gain domestic political support for its "sunshine policy" towards the north, and in Japan the right-wing forces which want to overturn Japan's post-war constitution and to procure nuclear weapons for Japan's own troops could triumph. This would mark the final failure of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The possession and even the use of nuclear weapons is clearly no longer taboo, but is increasingly regarded as a legitimate means of war or of enhancing a country's own security.  And at the same time, the U.S., which regards itself as the guardian of the non-proliferation treaty, is also expanding and perfecting its own nuclear arsenal. And it is doing this even though all five official nuclear powers - i.e. including the United States - have committed themselves in the non-proliferation treaty to full nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, Washington is working full steam ahead on building up missile defense systems and is thus potentially encouraging a global nuclear arms race. So the outcome of the North Korean crisis is vital. In India, Pakistan and Israel, three new nuclear powers have already emerged in recent years. And it is clear that many dictators regard the possession of or the capability to produce nuclear weapons as the most credible, if not the only security guarantee against the threat of American "disarmament wars". It is in the German and European interest to prevent this development.

The German Government and the European Commission should therefore give constructive backing to the multilateral talks. The concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula would be a feasible approach, as it would combine security guarantees of the nuclear powers with a sophisticated control and prohibition regime. Furthermore, North Korea would obtain the sought-after non-aggression guarantee. The experience made so far with nuclear-weapon-free zones is most positive. For example, the non-nuclear-weapon zone in south-east Asia helped pave the way for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to join the community of ASEAN states. Within the EU context, Germany should therefore work actively towards a treaty-based denuclearization of the region. The further erosion and undermining of the nuclear non-proliferation regime must be prevented at all costs and the existing arms control and disarmament regimes must be strengthened. Otherwise we shall be confronted by a new "nuclear world disorder" in which the unimpeded passing on of weapons of mass destruction together with the appropriate delivery systems can no longer be stopped. The outcome of the North Korean crisis will provide a first indication of where the journey is heading.