A European Model for New Common Security Institutions
Russia put forward a proposal for a new pan-European security architecture back in June 2008. It calls for a treaty that is binding under international law to be signed by all countries from "Vancouver to Vladivostok". In view of the continent's unsolved security issues, there is certainly a need to discuss possible ways to improve the European security architecture.
The idea initially met with a muted international response, but attention has increasingly been paid to it since the war in Georgia. Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Germany and especially France have at least shown they are willing to discuss it. At the Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers on 3 December, NATO also said it was open to a debate. What exactly is Medvedev proposing? What issues would be worth discussing and where are the stumbling blocks? And what are Russia's motives in putting forward its proposal? The Russian President justifies his proposal by saying that the existing European security architecture has not managed to implement the goal of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, namely of creating a united, free and secure Europe. In order to do that, he suggests holding a pan-European summit with all countries from "Vancouver to Vladivostok". The goal would be to prepare and adopt a security treaty that would be binding under international law.
Alexander Medvedev's proposal for a new European security model continues a good Russian and Soviet tradition: From Gorbachev's "Common House" to Yeltsin's proposals for a pan-European security order within the framework of the OSCE, to the many years of discussion within the OSCE on a "European security model for the 21st century". These models all had and have one thing in common, namely that the European order they are aiming to establish should not be antagonistic and not discriminatory. Such a system of collective security thus differs from a defence alliance like NATO, particularly since that organisation is dominated by the United States.
From Moscow's perspective that is perfectly understandable. The more NATO was reactivated, the more ideas of a common European foreign and security policy took a back seat. The rhetoric of the "Common House" of Europe of the brief Gorbachev era paled in the same way as the Charter of Paris fell into oblivion. Central European countries - the former Warsaw Pact countries - in particular held on to their prejudices against Russia that evolved over the course of history and defined the United States and NATO as the only guarantee of security against Moscow.
In consequence, Moscow sought to establish new alliances and new constellations of alliances that seemed unthinkable just a few years ago. By way of example, I should mention the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which comprises such complex and complicated groups of states as Russia, China, and the Central Asian countries, but also wants to win over India, Afghanistan and Iran. The basis of this cooperation is still dominated by functions and inter-governmental agreements. There is no common coordinated, regulated method of procedure. Furthermore, it is still not clear who will derive the greatest benefit from this constellation of powers in the future: Peking or Moscow?
Nevertheless, all these activities cannot hide the fact that Moscow is currently not in a comfortable position, because the CIS is falling apart. Some parts are seeking their salvation by orientating themselves to the West and turning their backs on Moscow. Others are clinging to an authoritarian, despotic status quo and are attempting unscrupulously to safeguard their own interests on all sides, which is tantamount to the ruling classes retaining power. Moscow's influence on the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia is waning, and the Kremlin is now competing with the EU and China when it comes to the supply and transmission of energy through these states. And then there is the rapid fall in energy prices as a result of the financial and economic crisis, which Moscow has, in turn, been especially affected by.
Provided that Medvedev's references are not simply old power-political reflexes, they represent an opportunity to once more integrate Russia into an institutional structure and its norms and rules. That is why we should take the suggestion seriously and take it up.
It is clear in my opinion that a new security policy organisation like the European Security Community (ESG) developed by Egon Bahr would have no chance of being realised or of being a success for that matter. That is why one should fall back on the existing European security architecture within the context of interconnected institutions (NATO, EU, OSCE). The OSCE already provides an institutional framework that is suited to taking up Russia's legitimate interest in being involved in a European security organisation on an equal footing. However, it would first have to be resurrected as a pan-European security policy organisation, since its operative significance mainly unfolded in the eastern part of the continent - and in Russia's eyes focussed too much on the democratic principles of the Charter of Paris there.
A revived OSCE can and will replace neither the EU nor NATO. However, it could establish rules and procedures could serve as a basis for the actions of these two organisations when they try to reach beyond their purview. It would thus on the one hand be conceived of as a European collective security organisation and, on the other hand, as an organisation that acts as a platform for global action. There are a lot of quite tough issues for both to deal with - and not just terrorism.
The five-day war in Georgia also reflects a manifest crisis within the system of cooperative security in Europe. The EU and, above all, NATO are having difficulty coping with this crisis, given that they are increasingly disagreeing with the key player, Russia. By suspending the NATO-Russia Council, NATO also robbed itself of a body that would have been almost predestined to deal with the crisis in Georgia. In addition, the war in the Caucasus made it clear that secession conflict management issues and the resolution of the conflict between national self-determination and territorial integrity have not yet been solved either in Europe or beyond its borders.
Options for a new European security order:
The following options for a future security and peace order in Europe are conceivable: It is clear that the existing European security organisations and institutions, that is NATO, the EU and the OSCE, will have to be included as the building blocks of any agreements. And it is neither possible nor desirable to establish new institutions quickly, since that could weaken the EU and thus lead to security risks. That danger becomes clear when one considers the resistance to any form of change in the status quo mobilised by the United State's European allies in Old and New Europe. This became clear, at least in part, at the Helsinki Conference of the OSCE in December 2008. It was not only the United State's Deputy Secretary of State, Matthew Bryza, but also the majority of the representatives of European NATO Member States who showed little enthusiasm when it came to Russian plans to rethink Europe's security architecture.
The following concrete options or scenarios towards a new pan-European security architecture are conceivable:
1. Upgrading the NATO-Russia Council or Russia's accession to NATO
The idea of taking Russia into NATO was raised in Moscow once before, in the early 1990s, but was then blocked in 1994 with the first wave of NATO enlargement to the East. This option has not been completely abandoned, it is only that the conditions and prerequisites are not made in Europe. The 2001 coalition against international terrorism provides an interesting analogy of "informal alliances", similar to the United States' way of dealing with NATO Member States when it came to the Iraq issue.
This option could be implemented in the medium to long term via a step-by-step increase in the NATO-Russia Council's consultation and decision-making mechanisms. Although this construct does not correspond to Russia's idea of a formal treaty concluded between NATO and Russia, its hallmarks are greater trust and reassurance on account of the continuing transatlantic dimension. The European Member States' guaranteed security situation would not change in the least. In addition, the United States would remain in the alliance as a partner.
2. Concluding contractual agreements between the EU and Russian concerning peace-keeping in Europe
The EU and Russia would agree on a common peace policy based militarily on the ESDP, which in turn would not deploy its own military contingents according to the old "double hat" construct, but would utilise integrated parts of NATO. These military contingents, together with Russian units, would be placed under a common supreme command and led by new institutions through political consultation and decision-making mechanisms (that would still need to be established) and, when needed, jointly deployed.
3. Upgrading the OSCE and/or developing the Charter of Paris
The same procedure could be applied to the OSCE. The EU and Russia would agree to a joint peace-keeping mechanism based politically on an upgraded and reformed OSCE with operative decision-making powers. The reformed OSCE would be given operative capabilities, including military resources for peace-building missions both by NATO or the ESDP and by Russia. Ultimate responsibility would and would have to still rest with the United Nations Security Council, which would have to legitimise the OSCE as a sub-contractor and regional organisation. Territorial restrictions on such missions would have to be ruled out for the OSCE area.
New impetus for arms control
Medvedev's "Helsinki II" idea should not be the only basis for discussion concerning a cooperative security order in Europe. It is more important that European countries develop their own suggestions and demands, so as to be able to test Moscow's willingness to cooperate.
Along with regional conflicts, the crisis in arms control and disarmament is one of the continent's key, unsolved security issues. In December 2007 Russia suspended its cooperation in protest at the pending ratification of the amended CFE Treaty by NATO Member States. Since then it has reported neither exercises nor troop movements and is not allowing any inspectors into the country. Although European countries are not directly involved, they are also affected by the crisis in nuclear arms control and disarmament between the United States and Russia. And then there is the argument about the US missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic and the fact that the START I Treaty expires in December 2009.
A pan-European summit would thus also, as a matter of urgency, have to give new impetus to conventional arms control and disarmament. That will not be easy - regardless of whether the objective is to still ratify the amended KSE Treaty or to negotiate a new treaty - a KSE II Treaty. Until then it would be important to get the transparency required under the Treaty going again.
Bilateral security arrangements would have to be reconsidered and transferred into a common security system. The planned deployment of US defence missile systems should therefore be suspended for the time being. A coordinated approach could then be agreed with Russia - incorporating the Bucharest NATO resolution. A new treaty limiting missile defence would make sense in that respect.
All the signs point to change: Disarmament and arms control appear to be on the brink of a revival, especially since the economic crisis now weighs heavily on the United States and Russia. These are bad times for expensive and strategically questionable arms projects. In addition, Russia and the United States need each other, that is the pragmatic side to the new friendly dialogue. The change in leadership in Washington provides the opportunity to clear away the mess left over from the Bush era and to freely improve relations or even to place them on a new, cooperative foundation.
Conclusion
The Russian diagnosis - namely that the objectives of the Charter of Paris have not been achieved and that there are security deficits in Europe - is in principle perfectly accurate.
There is therefore indeed a need to discuss the gaps in the European security system. The idea of holding a pan-European summit conference to that end also seems sensible. The suggestion that a binding security treaty could be agreed at that summit can also hardly be criticised per se. The content of such a treaty would be decisive, however. Principles and rules require institutions that help with their implementation. Which institutions should take on that task in Europe? Along with reviving security policy in the OSCE, stronger institutionalised cooperation between Moscow and Brussels would be of great benefit to European security.
The conclusion that remains is that without incorporating existing building blocks, any attempt at reform would fail and the exact opposite of what was intended would be achieved, namely to establish a pan-European peace order on the basis of trust and security guarantees that helps to overcome the new factual division of Europe. Ideally, the pan-European security conference that Medvedev has suggested holding could lead to a "Helsinki II" and a new Charter that is operatively enhanced by security policy.