Regional Security Policy at the Greater Horn of Africa. Analysis of regional conflicts and the path for political solutions.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues,

It is an honour and a pleasure for me to be allowed to give the dinner speech here tonight. The title of the conference - "Regional Security Policy at the Greater Horn of Africa. Analysis of regional conflicts and the path for political solutions" - already shows what a comprehensive and ambitious approach the organisers have taken to this issue.

I cannot and therefore would not wish to presume to be able to come even close to providing any solutions to the crises at the Horn of Africa. That would, incidentally, also go way beyond the scope of a dinner speech. Nevertheless, I would like to take the liberty of briefly addressing a few points and problems in the presence of this impressive array of experts.

The Greater Horn of Africa region (which includes the multiethnic states Ethiopia and Eritrea, the failing state Somalia and the small state Djibouti) is undeniably a chronic hot spot. Of course, the dominant crises in the region are the ongoing violent conflicts in parts of Somalia and the unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The two rivals have now accumulated a vast number of states which are supporting one of the two sides in Somalia. The less than 2,000 African Union troops have so far contributed little in the way of de-escalation and are mainly preoccupied with defending themselves.

From a security policy perspective the region has for several years also been involved in the global fight against transnational terrorism. Peace and conflict research regards the region, and specifically Somalia, as a spectacular example of the phenomena of "failing states" and "new" wars.

Only the Somalis themselves will be able to find a genuine solution for Somalia. And, in my opinion, that will have to be placed in a larger regional context. Up until now at any rate all manner of international interference in Somalia has come to nothing. The outlook for permanent peace is bleak. The precondition would be consistent democratisation and involving civil society forces in the political process. Since there do not appear to be any solutions forthcoming from within society and in view of the interference of external forces, regionalisation is a possible instrument of conflict management. Especially since there are other distribution conflicts in the region, namely conflicts over access to water, conflicts over access to education and food, conflicts over resources, over participation, over democratisation, over women's rights. I could continue adding to the list.

Allow me to make one remark from my vantage point as a politician specialising in disarmament issues: The supply and especially the demand factors underlying the purchase of (small) arms must be reduced at the Horn of Africa. That means effectively stemming the arms trade, engaging in arms control, demobilisation, demilitarisation and building the population's trust in the security authorities. The weapons embargo which the UN imposed against Somalia many years ago has proved to be completely ineffective!

In this context I would also like to call to mind Europe's experience. It shows that regional cooperation is possible even after two bloody world wars. It paved the way for the success story that is the European Union. In many cases regional organisations are better able to prevent violent conflicts and solve ongoing conflicts than states are. Regional and interregional cooperation is also essential in order to be able to meet the security policy challenges. However, a "regional security architecture" should not right away be defined as established institutions but should rather be understood as a security policy process. When it comes to establishing security communities, democracy is a useful but not a necessary precondition. When developing a pluralistic security community, renouncing violence, a consensus on values and reliability of expectations will suffice.

Although the European example cannot be transferred one-to-one to the African continent, there is, nevertheless, some positive news: Africa is on the move. The key economic indicators speak for themselves. Seven per cent growth is impressive. Particularly since it is not only based on commodities, but is also due to trade, industry and services. In addition, thanks to its massive raw material deposits, Africa is undergoing a "geostrategic renaissance". And is thereby acquiring a second image: Africa the impassive recipient of aid has been joined by Africa the player with resources and new self-confidence.

China was the first to understand that and is buying its oil, copper, cobalt and platinum all over the continent. And is not even turning its nose up at trade agreements with Sudan or Zimbabwe. Even the United States has long regarded Africa as more than just a continent that needs to be rid of AIDS. By 2015 it will probably be getting one quarter of its oil imports from African sources. The United States also wants to increase its marine forces along the oil-rich western coast. And so here too the matter of the democratic convictions of one's trade and alliance partners is often subordinated to other interests.

But the African Union is also to take on responsibility. It is establishing an African security architecture and taking its economic development into its own hands. I believe that promoting regional cooperation is also extremely important at the Horn of Africa, to which end the IGAD needs to be further developed. It has already played a positive role in the peace processes in Sudan and in Somalia. But it also remains an organisation of "estranged brothers", marked by mistrust, opposing interests and Ethiopia's hegemonic pretensions. The IGAD is also highly dependent on donors and has only weak institutional capacities.

What is needed is constructive, multilateral commitment from the international community. It must put pressure on the players around the Horn of Africa and must above all support consistent democratisation processes. Overall, a wide-ranging security architecture based on the concept of "human security" is needed for the Horn of Africa. However, that will require a fundamental intrasocial change process on the road to sustainable democratisation.

From what I have seen and heard at the conference so far I am confident that those present will use the remaining time to continue to work constructively on these issues and problems. I hope you all enjoy your meal. And I would like to end by raising my glass and thanking the FES and the organisers for the - as ever - excellent organisation and hospitality.